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Abstract
This paper presents novel empirical evidence for the prediction from Beckers (1957)
famous theory, that competition drives discrimination out of the market. We use a compre-
hensive business registration reform in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment to study the
e¤ect of increased product market competition on gender discrimination. We use employer-
employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers, and exploit the staggered
implementation of the reform across municipalities for identication. Increased competition
following the reform increases growth of the female employment share and reduces the
gender pay gap for middle-managers and for medium- and high-skilled workers but not for
top-managers or the unskilled. We also nd that discriminatory employers, approximated
by a low female employment share, are more likely to exit and those that survive reduce
overall employment growth following the reform, while non-discriminatory employers grow
faster. Existing evidence has shown that gender discrimination reduces output; our ndings
suggest that entry deregulation can contribute to reduce ine¢ ciencies arising from gender
discrimination.
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1 Introduction
Women earn lower wages than men in all economies, including northern European nations such
as Sweden and Norway, which are among the least discriminatory countries.1 An extensive body
of empirical research has documented the wage gap between men and women.2 Although the
gender wage gap has narrowed in recent decades, the di¤erence in average wages has been very
persistent. Gender discrimination creates ine¢ ciencies that contribute to signicantly reduce
output across countries (see, e.g., Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2016; Cuberes and Teignier, 2016).
Therefore, nding appropriate policies to respond to gender discrimination is important. In
this paper, we study how entry deregulation, and the resulting increase in product market
competition, contributes to reduce gender discrimination.
Our empirical analysis is framed by Beckers (1957) classical theory of employer discrimin-
ation, in which personal prejudice is the source of discrimination. The existence of a residual
gender wage gap between workers performing the same tasks with the same skills, experience
and educational level has been interpreted as reecting discrimination. That interpretation is
consistent with Beckers model. Gender-biased employers have a preference for male workers
even if their wages are higher than those of females with the same productivity. This gives rise
to segregation of workers across employers and to a gender wage gap.3 Becker (1957) argues that
as discrimination increases costs, it is hard to sustain in a competitive market. An implication of
Beckers (1957) model is that increased product market competition will reduce discrimination.
This can happen as competitive pressure forces discriminatory employers, who have relatively
lower prots, to exit the market, reduce growth, or give up their discriminatory behavior. As a
result, demand for female workers should increase and the gender pay gap decrease.
This paper investigates the dynamic implication from Becker (1957), that changes in com-
petition will reduce employer discrimination. We exploit a comprehensive business registration
reform across industries in Portugal - the On the Spot Firm program - as a quasi-natural
experiment to investigate whether increased product market competition reduces gender dis-
crimination. We use linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and
workers to investigate empirically how the reform a¤ects the relationship between discrimina-
tion and rm survival and growth, as well as growth in the share of female employees and the
gender wage gap. We estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap for workers with
di¤erent skill levels and across the corporate hierarchy.
The On the Spot Firm program was implemented from 2005 with the aim of reducing
1Hausmann et al. (2006).
2See, for example, Bayard et al. (2003) for evidence on the U.S. labor market; Albrecht et al. (2003) for
Sweden; Arulampalam et al. (2003) for eleven European countries; Kawaguchi (2007) for Japan; among many
others.
3Borjas and Ramey (1995), Hellerstein, et al. (2002) and Black and Brainerd (2004) provide more detailed
discussions of Beckers (1957) model.
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the time, cost and bureaucracy to register a new business. Prior to 2005, an entrepreneur
was required to visit several public o¢ ces and to complete 11 procedures to register a rm.
It took on average 78 days and cost around 13.5% of GDP per capita in fees. The On the
Spot Firm program introduced one-stop shops where entrepreneurs can register a company
in a single visit, and complete the process in less than an hour, at a cost of 3% of GDP per
capita. The program was progressively rolled out across municipalities over time.4 We exploit
the cross-municipality-time variation in the implementation of the reform to identify the e¤ect
of increased competition on gender discrimination.
Using the roll-out of the program as an exogenous source of increased rm entry and product
market competition, we provide quasi-natural experimental evidence on the prediction from
Becker (1957) that competition reduces discrimination, reected in the female employment
share and in the gap between the wages of male and female workers. The unusually rich
and detailed information from the employer-employee data allows us to control for workers
observable characteristics, such as gender, age, education, skill level, occupation, experience
and type of contract of employment. We obtain estimates that also account for worker or rm-
worker xed e¤ects, thus controlling for unobserved individual or match heterogeneity and for
composition e¤ects. This is a strength of the dataset.
We show that the On the Spot Firm program signicantly increased rm entry within
industries and municipalities, thus increasing product market competition. We nd that non-
discriminatory employers, approximated by a larger female employment share, increase employ-
ment growth after the reform while discriminatory employers grow slower over time and have
a higher probability of exiting the market. The increase in competition following the business
entry reform increases growth in the female share, particularly in managerial and high-skill po-
sitions, both within rms and across rms in an industry. We also nd that the gender pay gap
is reduced following the reform for middle-managers, high-skilled and medium-skilled workers
in a¤ected municipalities, but not for top-managers or unskilled workers. We obtain a positive
and statistically signicant di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on the pay of female workers; the
coe¢ cients on interaction terms between a female indicator, the reform dummy variable and
the skill category of the worker are positive and statistically signicant for workers in those
categories.
Our estimates imply a reduction in the gender pay gap of 1.7 percentage points for middle-
managers and high-skilled workers and of 1 percentage point for medium-skilled workers. The
magnitude of these estimates is equivalent to a reduction in the gender pay gap by 15% and
13% for middle-managers and high-skilled workers, respectively, and by 7.6% for medium-skilled
workers, relative to the overall gender pay gap for those categories. We nd that while the wage
4The policy was hugely successful, and as a result Portugal rose from 113th to 26th in the World Bank Ease
of Doing Businessranking of countries.
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of male workers in middle-managerial positions increased by 2.2%, the wage of females in-
creased by a larger 3.9% as a result of the reform. Males in high-skill jobs experienced a wage
increase of 1.3% while female wage increased by 3% in treatment municipalities. The wage
of medium-skilled males was not a¤ected by the reform, but that of females in the same skill
category increased by 1%. Therefore, the business entry reform improved womens relative
pay. Our ndings are consistent with the prediction from Becker (1957) that product market
competition reduces employer discrimination. By increasing the e¢ ciency loss from discrimin-
ating against women, competition leads to increased employment growth of the more e¢ cient
non-discriminatory employers, and induces discriminatory employers to change their behavior.
We also estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap across the corporate hier-
archy, using ner occupational categories; we nd that the reform is associated with a narrowing
of the gender pay gap for executives, except for the CEO. This suggests that the labor market
for top executives still especially favors men and increased competition does not improve female
CEOsrelative pay.
Although previous studies investigated the relationship between product market competition
and discrimination, evidence is still scant. Most studies focus on cross-sectional correlations
or on potentially endogenous time variation, and thus do not explicitly estimate the causal
mechanism. By using the On the Spot Firm program as a quasi-natural experiment, we
are able to identify the causal link between competition and gender discrimination cleanly.
Moreover, most previous studies that investigate the relationship between competition and
discrimination use industry-level concentration ratios, the Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
or rm-level measures of market power to measure competition. These measures face a number
of well known limitations.5 By exploiting an exogenous source of increased competition, we
avoid the caveats associated with common measures of competition and obtain clean estimates
of that relationship.
The focus of most existing papers has been to investigate whether industries with higher
degree of concentration or rms with more market power pay females lower wages than males
or hire relatively less female workers. An important earlier paper is Ashenfelter and Hannan
(1986), which analyses the relationship between product market competition and discrimination
in the U.S. banking industry, using a cross-section of geographical markets. Some studies focus
on whether rms with lower shares of female employees have lower prots, particularly in more
competitive environments. Hellerstein et al. (2002) and Kawaguchi (2007) investigate the
relationship between prots and female employment shares across rms with varying degree of
market power to examine the implications of Beckers (1957) theory. Weber and Zulehner (2014)
investigate how changes in concentration a¤ect the relationship between female employment
5These include potential endogeneity, correlation with omitted variables and non-monotonicity of their e¤ects
on outcome variables (Sutton, 1991).
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shares and rm prot or exit probability, based on rm entry and survival in Austria.6
Our paper is more related to a branch of empirical studies that use panel data to investigate
how changes in competition over time a¤ect female wages or female employment shares. Black
and Strahan (2001) exploit the deregulation in the banking industry in the U.S. from the
mid-1970s, while Black and Brainerd (2004) focus on increased competition from international
trade. These studies nd evidence that competition increases the relative wages of females.
By exploiting an episode of comprehensive entry deregulation across industries, our natural
experiment allows us to obtain results that can be interpreted more generally than in the banking
industry, where the structure of compensation could have been marked by idiosyncrasies. By
focussing on a more recent period, characterized by deregulation in many countries and by a
narrowing of the gender pay gap, we shed light on the link between the two phenomena.
We interpret our ndings in the light of preference-based models of discrimination (Becker,
1957) since the theory predicts that increased product market competition will reduce employer
discrimination. Another class of economic models focusses on statistical discrimination. Stat-
istical discrimination is the solution to a signal extraction problem and arises when rational,
information-seeking, employers use prior information on aggregate group characteristics, such
as group-specic means, to evaluate individual characteristics. This can lead to workers with
the same observable characteristics being treated di¤erently because they belong to di¤erent
groups (see Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; and more recently Moro, 2003 and Morrow and Norman,
2004). However, there is not a clear link between product market competition and statistical
discrimination.7
Our paper is also broadly related to the literature that studies the gender pay gap more
generally. Blau and Kahn (2000) review that literature; more recent studies include Blau and
Kahn (2016), Goldin (2014) and Bayard et al. (2003).
Our results have important implications for policy that aims to improve product market
competition through entry deregulation. Our ndings that reducing entry barriers contributes
to increase the female employment share growth and narrow the gender pay gap, particularly for
medium-skilled, high-skilled and managerial workers, suggests that deregulation also contributes
to reduce ine¢ ciencies arising from gender discrimination. Existing evidence shows that gender
discrimination signicantly reduces output across countries; therefore, our ndings are relevant
for future policy advice to other countries.8
6Heyman et al. (2013) use employer-employee data from Sweden to analyze how product market competition
and rm takeovers a¤ect the gender wage di¤erential and gender workforce composition. Winter-Ebmer (2007)
use meta-analysis to study product market competition and gender wage gaps, while List (2004) is an inuential
example of the experimental literature on the impact of competition on discrimination.
7 It could be argued that increased competition induces rms to improve management practises, potentially
resulting in better screening mechanisms of applicants and less need to rely on group-specic means. But the
e¤ect on hiring would depend on the relative change in the signal-to-noise ratio, and on the distributions of group
characteristics. Therefore, it is not clear how increased product market competition would a¤ect discrimination
in the statistical sense.
8A number of studies have also shown that entry and competition contribute to productivity growth and
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the On the Spot Firmpro-
gram. Section 3 describes the data used and the identication strategy and presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses the results on the e¤ect of the quasi-natural exper-
iment on rm creation, the relationship between gender discrimination and rm growth and
survival, growth of the female employment share and the gender pay gap. The last section
concludes.
2 The On the Spot Firmbusiness registration reform
This section describes our quasi-natural experiment, the On the Spot Firm business regis-
tration reform. The program was introduced in May 2005 by the newly elected government,
which took o¢ ce in March 2005. The objective of the program was to promote national and
foreign investment by reducing the cost and bureaucracy of starting-up a rm. To register a
new rm in Portugal prior to 2005 an entrepreneur was required to full 11 procedures and to
complete 20 forms. The entrepreneur would need to visit separate o¢ ces of the Ministries of
Justice, Finance, Economy and Labor and Social Security to obtain the necessary documents
and approvals. The process took 78 days on average and fees equivalent to 13.5% of GDP per
capita.
In 2005, the new government created a task force, the Unit for Coordination of Administrat-
ive Modernization (UCMA), to coordinate across ministries in order to improve the e¢ ciency
of public services and reduce the red tape associated with setting up a new rm. This resulted
in the introduction of the On the Spot Firm (Empresa na Hora) program by the Ministry
of Justice.9 The program was intended to reduce the time and complexity of the process of
registering a rm. The business registration reform was unannounced and unanticipated.
The program introduced one-stop shops - non-prot seeking government o¢ ces - where
entrepreneurs can register a company at a single o¢ ce desk in less than an hour, and at a
cost of around 3% of GDP per capita, below the OECD average of 6.8%.10 The legal and
commercial registration is completed in the one-stop shops, and the entrepreneur receives the
rm identication card and the corporate tax payer and social security numbers in the same
day. The information is internally exchanged and sent electronically by the registry authorities
to all ministries and authorities involved in the process.11
[Figure 1 about here]
innovation (e.g., Djankov et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2009).
9http://www.empresanahora.mj.pt/ENH/sections/EN_homepage.html
10World Bank (2006).
11State-owned rms or rms in industries with industry-specic requirements or permits are not allowed to be
registered in the one-stop shops of the On the Spot Firmprogram. These are mainly in the nance, insurance
and transportation sectors. We exclude observations in these industries from our analysis.
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Due to resource constraints and uncertainty about its success, the On the Spot Firm
program was not introduced simultaneously in all municipalities. Four pilot one-stop shops
were opened in July 2005 in the municipalities of Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita.12 The
program then expanded over time to municipalities across Portugal. By the end of 2009 there
were 164 one-stop shops dispersed throughout the country. The geographical dispersion and
opening dates of the one-stop shops are shown in Figure 1. As evidenced, the program was
progressively rolled-out randomly across municipalities. We exploit this cross-municipality-
time-specic variation in the implementation of the On the Spot Firmprogram to identify
the e¤ect of the resulting increase in competition on gender discrimination.
The policy was hugely successful; the total waiting time was reduced by 230,000 days in a
year and companies saved around 16 million euros. Portugal is now one of the fastest countries
in the world in starting-up a business, and was considered top reformer in business entry in the
World Bank Doing Business report.
3 Data description and identication strategy
3.1 Data description
Our empirical analysis is based on the Portuguese linked employer-employee data, Quadros de
Pessoal (QP), collected annually by the Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity. All private
sector rms employing at least one worker are legally required to complete the survey and to
make it available at the rm. This results in a high degree of coverage and reliability of the
data. In the data, each rm and each worker are assigned a unique time-invariant identier
which allows them to be traced over time.
Worker-level information includes the workers gender, age, education level (schooling), level
of skill, occupation, type of contract of employment, hiring date in the rm, promotions, monthly
hours of work (normal and overtime) and earnings, which are split into the components: base
wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular benets and overtime pay. Firm-level data
include the year of creation, industry, location, total number of workers, number of establish-
ments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic
private, public or foreign). The information in each year refers to the month when the survey
is collected, which is October since 1994.
Our analysis covers the period from 2002 to 2009 and includes private sector manufacturing
and services rms, excluding agriculture, shing and mining, covering 46 industries. The full
employer-employee sample includes 438,755 distinct rms (contributing with 1,881,740 rm-
year observations) and 3,694,017 workers (contributing 15,340,574 worker-year observations)
12Administratively, Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities which are the seat of local administrative and
executive power.
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over the period.13 We identify rm entry using the variable that reports the year of creation
of the rm. A rm is an entrant in year t if the reported year of creation is t and the rm is
observed for the rst time in the data in t.14 Table 1 shows the distribution of all rms and
entrants in each year, as well as workers. Column (3) reports the share of new rms created
in municipalities with On the Spot Firmone-stop shops. In 2005, 20% of the newly created
rms were registered in municipalities where the reform had been implemented, increasing to
76% in 2009. Overall, in our data 47,716 rms were created in treatment municipalities.
[Table 1 about here]
The main dependent variable in our specications is the (natural log of) real hourly wage
of the worker; this is obtained by summing the monthly base pay, which is the gross wage for
the normal hours of work, tenure related payments, and regular benets, and then dividing
by the normal hours of work. The hourly wage is then deated to obtain the real wage. We
use information in the QP data on the educational level and occupational category of each
worker. The level of education is classied according to the UNESCO International Standard
Classication of Education (ISCED) of 1997.15 Occupations are classied according to the
International Standard Classication of Occupations of 1988 (ISCO-88). We exploit information
on the occupational category of the workers to investigate the e¤ect of the reform on the
gender pay gap for CEOs, department managers and other workers. We use the 3-digit level
ISCO-88 occupations to distinguish CEOs (individuals in ISCO category 121), department
managers (individuals in the categories 122 and 123) and other workers (all other occupational
categories).16
In the QP data workers are also classied according to eight qualication levels based on the
position in the rms hierarchy and on the complexity, responsibility and skill requirement of the
tasks they perform.17 Appendix Table A.1 describes in detail the hierarchical levels and their
skill content in accordance with the law.18 We exploit this information to investigate the e¤ect
13The nal estimation sample is smaller due to missing data for some variables.
14Since the data is collected in October each year, we recover information on rm births when the reported
year of creation is t  1 but the rm is rst observed in t. In those cases the rm is considered an entrant in t:
15The correspondence between ISCED levels and years of schooling in Portugal is: ISCED 1 - rst and second
stages of basic education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 - lower secondary education (9 years of schooling);
ISCED 3 - upper secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 - higher education (more than 15 years
of schooling, corresponding to university degrees). In Portugal, there is no degree corresponding to ISCED level
4; and it is not possible to distinguish between ISCED levels 5 and 6 from the data.
16 ISCO88 category 121 is Directors and Chief Executives; ISCO88 122 is Production and Operations De-
partment Managers; and ISCO88 123 is Other Department Managers(including Finance and administration,
Personnel and industrial relations, Sales and marketing, Advertising and public relations, Supply and distribu-
tion, Computing services, Research and development, Other). The category Directors and Chief Executives
can include top executives other than the CEO, but rms in our sample have on average (and median) one
individual in that category; and we refer to them as CEOs.
17The levels are: 1 Top executives (top management); 2 Intermediary executives (middle management); 3 
Supervisors, team leaders and foremen; 4 Higher-skilled professionals; 5 Skilled professionals; 6 Semi-skilled
professionals; 7 Non-skilled professionals; 8 Apprentices, interns and trainees.
18They are established in the Law Decree no. 121/78 of July.
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of the business registration reform on the gender pay gap for workers in di¤erent skill categories
and across the corporate hierarchy. For that analysis, we aggregate the skill levels and dene
ve categories: top-management (level 1), middle-management (levels 2 and 3), high-skilled
(level 4), medium-skilled (level 5) and low-skilled (levels 6 to 8). We also use that variable to
identify the e¤ects of the reform on the gender pay gap for managerial workers (those in levels
1 and 2) relative to all other workers in the corporation.
Table 2 reports detailed summary statistics of the log real wage for each skill and occupa-
tional category and managerial position. As shown in the table, CEOs are the group of workers
with higher average log real hourly wage, followed by department managers, managerial workers
and high-skilled workers. Within each category, we also report statistics for female and for male
wages. In all categories, the average and median wages are always lower for females than for
males. We will investigate in the next sections these gender pay gaps in a regression setting and
how the increased competition following the rm entry reform a¤ected the gender pay gap for
workers in di¤erent skill categories and occupations.
[Table 2 about here]
In our specications, we control for the workersobservable characteristics, including gender,
education, tenure and its square and the type of contract of employment (whether open-end
or closed-end). Observable rm characteristic are also controlled for, including the log of rm
size (number of employees), ownership type (private, public or foreign), whether the rm is
an exporter, and whether the rm is multi-plant. To obtain information on exporters, we
merge the employer-employee data with data from the International Trade dataset collected by
the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics. In Appendix Table A.2 we present descriptive
statistics of all variables for the full sample (column 1) as well as by skill category (columns 2-6),
for managerial and non-managerial workers (columns 7 and 8) and by occupation (columns 9-
11). Overall, female workers account for 45% of the observations in our data, but in the sample
of CEOs, only 19% of observations are for females. Although only about 9% of observations
are for workers with a university degree, this proportion is signicantly higher in the group of
high-skilled workers (24%), CEOs (74%) and managerial workers (59%). This suggests that our
measure of the skill requirement of the tasks performed by a worker is not a direct outcome of
educational attainment. Regarding the On the Spot Firm, 35% of observations are located in
municipalities with one-stop shops. Table A.3 reports summary statistics of rm-level covariates.
3.2 Identication strategy
To identify the e¤ects of increased product market competition on gender discrimination, we
exploit the roll-out of the On the Spot Firmprogram across municipalities over time. We use
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the variation in the timing of adoption across municipalities for identication. The e¤ect of the
reform on the outcomes of interest, particularly on the gender pay di¤erential, is thus identied
o¤ cross-municipality di¤erences in the reform implementation over time. The treatment group
includes rms and individuals in municipalities that introduced the On the Spot Firmpro-
gram. The treatment variable in our empirical specications is Spotmt, which takes the value
1 in the year (t) when the program is adopted in municipality m and in all subsequent years,
and 0 otherwise.
As discussed above, the policy change was unanticipated, and exogenous. The empirical
strategy relies on the assumption that the program was not introduced in a systematic way across
municipalities; specically, that it is not correlated with pre-existing trends in the variables of
interest. In our regressions, among a host of factors that may a¤ect the outcomes, we control
for municipality xed e¤ects, which absorb any di¤erences across municipalities. However, we
start by showing that the order of adoption of the On the Spot Firmacross municipalities is
uncorrelated with previous trends in the variables used in our analysis.
Table 3 reports pre-reform average growth (over 2002-2004) for the variables of interest, for
the group of municipalities that adopt the reform later, from 2007 onwards (column 1), and
for the group that adopt in the rst years, 2005 and 2006 (column 2); as well as the di¤erence
between the two (column 3). We test whether growth trends prior to the policy change di¤er
between early and late adopting municipalities; column (4) reports the p-value for the null
hypothesis that the means are equal for both groups. We nd that there are no statistically
signicant di¤erences for any of the variables of interest. This evidence shows that the order in
which municipalities introduced the program is not correlated with pre-reform trends in wages,
rm creation, rm growth, female employment share growth and the gender pay gap, strongly
supporting the identication strategy.
[Table 3 about here]
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmreform on rm entry
This section investigates the e¤ect of the On the Spot Firm business registration reform
on rm entry. This analysis assesses the validity of the reform as an exogenous source of
increased rm entry, and competition, for the main analysis of the paper, on the e¤ects on
gender discrimination. In particular, our main interest is in investigating the prediction that
increased competition reduces the gender pay gap.
We start by showing in Figure 2 average rm entry in municipalities that adopt the reform,
in each year before and after adoption; that is, for each lag and lead relative to the year
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of implementation in each municipality. As shown in the gure, we observe that rm entry
started to increase substantially in a¤ected municipalities since the year when the reform is
implemented. The gure thus suggests that the business registration reform has led to increased
rm entry.19 While the gure depicts raw averages in rm entry over time across industries and
municipalities that adopt the reform, it does not take into account municipality and industry
characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity, or general trends across all municipalities. For this,
we turn to our regression analysis.
[Figure 2 about here]
We studied the e¤ect of the On the Spot Firmprogram on rm entry in previous work
(Fernandes et al., 2014, 2018) and this analysis draws from that work. To study the e¤ect of
the reform on rm creation, we estimate the following specication, for the period from 2002
to 2009:
Ymst = Spotmt + d(:) + mst (1)
Where the dependent variable, Ymst, is the number of new entrant rms by municipality-
industry-year (mst) or alternatively, the ratio between the number of new rms and the number
of incumbents. Spotmt is the On the Spot Firmexperiment indicator variable; it is equal to
one in the year when the On the Spot Firmreform is adopted in municipality m and in all
subsequent years, and it is equal to zero otherwise.20 We control for industry xed e¤ects,
ds, which absorb any industry characteristics that may a¤ect rm entry, year xed e¤ects,
dt, to account for aggregate trends and municipality xed e¤ects, dm, which account for any
unobserved municipality characteristics that could be related to rm entry, particularly any
di¤erences between treated and non-treated municipalities. The standard errors are clustered
by municipality, the level at which the reform is introduced, to account for potential correlation
between observations within municipalities. We expect that the entry deregulation led to in-
creased rm entry; therefore, the estimate of the coe¢ cient on the Spot variable, , is expected
to be positive and statistically signicant.
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2)
report results for the number of new rms as the dependent variable. We include di¤erent
19We nd a signicant increase in the number on new entrant rms following the reform. However, the entry
size of startups did not change following the entry reform. In particular, as shown in Appendix table A.3, the
average size of On the Spot Firmentrants is 3.9 workers, while the average entry size before the reform and in
non-adopter municipalities is 4. Moreover, the overall average rm size in Portugal is small, with a distribution
characterized by a large mass of small rms and some large rms; the average incumbent size is 9.7 workers and
average entrant size is 4. It is therefore expected that the increased rm entry within a municipality-industry
cell increases product market competition at that level.
20Some municipalities introduce additional one-stop shops in subsequent years. The treatment dummy variable
is set to one after the rst shop is opened because from then onwards, the program is in e¤ect, and an entrepreneur
can register a rm in the On the Spot Firmo¢ ce.
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sets of xed e¤ects, as explained above. As shown, the rm entry reform is associated with an
increase in the number of new rms: we obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient
on the Spot variable. This result is obtained in both the linear model presented in Table 4, as
well as in a negative binomial regression, presented in Appendix Table A.4. The linear estimates
imply that, controlling for municipality, year and industry xed e¤ects (column 2), the number
of new rms increased by 18% within industries and municipalities following the reform, relative
to the sample mean.
In columns (3) and (4), we use as alternative dependent variable the ratio between the
number of new rms and the number of incumbents. The results remain robust; the coe¢ cient on
the Spot variable remains positive and statistically signicant. The estimate of 0.009 in column
(4) implies that the ratio of new rms to incumbents increased by about 1 percentage point,
which is equivalent to a 14% increase relative to the sample mean (7%). These results show that
the On the Spot Firmpolicy is associated with a statistically signicant and economically
important increase in rm entry, and thus product market competition. Our results on entry
deregulation are consistent with those in Bruhn (2011), who nds that a similar reform in
Mexico increased the number of new business registrations by 5% and employment by 2.2%;
and with Branstetter et al. (2014), who use the same reform as in this paper and nd that it is
associated with an increase in the number of new rms per 100,000 inhabitants of around 17%.
[Table 4 about here]
In the specications reported in Table 4, we identify the average e¤ect of the On the Spot
Firmreform on rm entry over the entire post-reform period. Next, we estimate the e¤ects in
each year before and after the reform, thus assessing whether the e¤ects vary with the duration
of the program. We estimate a specication which includes a set of dummy variables, Spotml, for
each lag and lead, l, relative to the year of implementation of the reform in a given municipality,
m. In this specication, each coe¢ cient is estimated relative to the period prior to t-4 and to
non-adopters. Figure 3 presents the estimated coe¢ cients for each lag and lead year and the
95% condence interval (CI) from a specication with the number of new rms as dependent
variable and with industry, municipality and year xed e¤ects. The dots on the solid line show
the estimated coe¢ cients, and the two dashed lines the 95% condence bands of the estimates.
As Figure 3 shows, we nd that the estimated coe¢ cients are close to zero and statistically
insignicant in the years prior to the On the Spot Firmprogram. The e¤ect of the program
on rm entry becomes positive and statistically signicant in the year of adoption. The e¤ect
increases over time after adoption, with an increase in business registration. The coe¢ cients on
the Spot terms are always positive and statistically signicant in all periods after the reform is
implemented.21
21The e¤ect seems to start decreasing in t+ 4; however, as the lags and leads increase, identication relies on
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[Figure 3 about here]
In sum, this section shows that the On the Spot Firm reform signicantly increased
rm entry in a¤ected municipalities. In the following sections we use the reform as a quasi-
natural experiment, which exogenously increased rm entry and product market competition,
to estimate the e¤ects on the relationship between gender discrimination and rm growth and
survival, growth of the female employment share and the gender pay gap in di¤erent skill
categories and across the corporate hierarchy.
4.2 The On the Spot Firmreform, gender discrimination and rm growth
and survival
According to Beckers (1957) hypothesis, discriminatory employers satisfy their prejudiced pref-
erences at the expense of prots. Increased product market competition should therefore drive
discrimination out of the market, as competitive pressure forces discriminatory employers to exit
the market or submit to market pressure and change their behavior. Since competition increases
the e¢ ciency loss from discriminating, it is expected that with increased product market com-
petition surviving discriminatory employers grow less over time relative to non-discriminatory
employers. That is, non-discriminatory employers should increase overall employment growth,
relative to discriminatory rms. Having shown above that the On the Spot Firmbusiness
registration reform led to increased rm entry in a¤ected municipalities, in this section we in-
vestigate the e¤ect of the reform on the relationship between rm employment growth and the
level of discrimination, approximated by the female share in the workforce. We estimate the
following specication, at the rm-year level:
 ln(Njmt) = 1(Femshj;t 1Spotm;t 1)+2Spotm;t 1+3Femshj;t 1+Z 0jt+d()+jmt (2)
The dependent variable is employment growth for rm j, in municipality m, between years
t 1 and t (lnNjmt  lnNjm;t 1). Femsh is the proxy for discrimination: the share of females in
the rms workforce. We use two alternative measures, the previous period female employment
share and, alternatively, the female share in the year prior to the introduction of the reform, for
each rm. The latter allows us to assess whether less discriminatory rms prior to the reform
grow faster after the reform is implemented, relative to discriminatory rms. We include rm
observed characteristics in matrix Z 0jt: ownership type (domestic private, public or foreign), a
dummy for whether the rm is an exporter and a dummy for whether the rm is multi-plant.
We also include year xed e¤ects (dt) in our specications to account for global trends, and
fewer municipalities to estimate the e¤ects, that could explain the lower coe¢ cient. For example, for lead t+4,
estimation is based only on municipalities that adopt in 2005.
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control for municipality (dm) and industry (ds) xed e¤ects or, in alternative specications, for
rm xed e¤ects (dj); these absorb unobserved municipality, industry or rm characteristics
that may a¤ect rm growth.
The coe¢ cient of interest in equation (2) is 1, on the interaction between the female-share
proxy for discrimination and the reform dummy variable, Femshj;t 1  Spotm;t 1. We expect
1 to be positive; that is, a positive relationship is expected between the female share and
overall employment growth following the reform. Non-discriminatory employers, approximated
by higher female shares, should grow faster relative to the less e¢ cient prejudiced employers.
Table 5 presents the results from linear regressions of the growth in employment in surviving
rms. Panel A uses the sample of all rms. In columns (1) and (2) we use the lagged time-
varying female employment share to proxy for discrimination, while in columns (3) and (4) we
use as alternative discrimination proxy the female share in the year prior to the introduction
of the reform. Even-numbered columns include year and rm xed e¤ects, thus accounting for
rmsunobservable characteristics.
We obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction term of main
interest, Femshj;t 1Spotm;t 1, showing that a higher female employment share is associated
with increased rm employment growth following the reform. That is, the less discriminatory
rms have higher employment growth. This is observed both across rms in an industry as
well as within rms. The estimated coe¢ cient of 0.013 in column (2) implies that following the
reform, a one standard deviation increase in the female fraction (0.41) is associated with higher
rm employment growth by 0.5 percentage points. The results are robust for the alternative
discrimination proxy, in column (4). The stand-alone Spot coe¢ cient is negative and statistically
signicant, showing that the less e¢ cient discriminatory employers reduce employment growth
after the business entry reform.
These results show that there is a positive di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on rm employ-
ment growth for non-discriminatory employers, approximated by a larger female share. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that non-discriminatory employers expand employment following
increased competition, relative to discriminatory employers.
[Table 5 about here]
The share of females in the workforce as a proxy for employer discrimination is more revealing
about employerstastes for larger rms than for smaller rms. For example, a very small rm
has a positive probability of ending up with a higher share of males even if the employer is not
gender biased; but this probability decreases with rm size (see also Weber and Zulehner, 2014).
Therefore, we should nd stronger e¤ects of the female share on employment growth for larger
rms, if the relationship captures the e¤ect of discrimination. In Panel B of Table 5, we estimate
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the same specications but for a sample that excludes very small rms: those with less than
10 workers throughout. We continue to nd that the coe¢ cient on the Femshj;t 1Spotm;t 1
term is positive and statistically signicant. As expected, the e¤ects are now stronger; the
magnitude of the estimates is larger in the sample of larger rms. In the preferred specications,
with rm xed e¤ects (columns 2 and 4), we nd that while discriminatory employers, with low
female shares, reduce employment growth with the increased competition following the reform,
non-discriminatory employers increase overall employment growth. These ndings support the
hypothesis that increased competition reduces discrimination by reallocating market shares to
the more e¢ cient non-discriminatory rms.
Next, we examine whether the competitive pressure following the reform contributes to
increase the probability that discriminatory employers exit the market. We estimate specic-
ations similar to equation (2) above, but for the rms exit probability dummy variable. The
dependent variable in these specications, Exitjmt, takes the value 1 if the rm exits the market
in year t and zero if it survives. To avoid a bias from the relationship between rm size and
survival, we use the sample that excludes very small rms, with less than 10 workers.22 The
interaction between the female-share proxy for discrimination and the reform dummy variable,
Femshj;t 1  Spotm;t 1, captures whether less discriminatory employers - approximated by a
higher female share - have a lower exit probability after the On the Spot Firmreform, relative
to discriminatory employers.
It is a well known result that competition increases the probability of rm liquidation (e.g.
Schmidt, 1997). Therefore, on the one hand, increased rm entry following the reform is ex-
pected to increase the rm exit probability, on average. On the other hand, if competition
contributes to drive discrimination out of the market, the exit probability is expected to be
relatively higher for the less e¢ cient discriminatory rms.
We also consider a regression that allows the relationship between the reform and the rm
exit probability to vary by quartiles of the rms female share distribution. We divide rms
into four quartiles of the female share distribution in the year prior to the introduction of the
reform, since the quartiles remain constant for a rm, and dene quartile dummies, IFemshjq ,
which take the value 1 if rm j is in quartile q (q = 1; :::; 4) of the female share distribution,
and zero otherwise.23 We then estimate a specication with interaction terms between the On
the Spot Firmvariable and the discrimination proxy quartile dummies, Spotm;t 1  IFemshjq .
[Table 6 about here]
22As discussed above, the share of females as a proxy for employer discrimination is also more revealing about
employerstastes for larger rms than for smaller ones.
23Quartile 1 is the lowest female share quartile, and quartile 4 is the highest.
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Table 6 reports the results. In columns (1) and (2), we nd that the coe¢ cient on the
stand alone Spot variable is positive, and is statistically signicant when rm xed e¤ects are
included (column 2). This shows that increased competition following the reform raises the
probability of rm exit, on average, controlling for rm characteristics and for the exhaustive
sets of xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the reform variable and
the discrimination proxy (Femshj;t 1  Spotm;t 1) is negative, as expected, but statistically
insignicant.
In columns (3) and (4), we estimate a more exible specication that allows the relationship
between the reform and the exit probability to vary by quartiles of the discrimination proxy
distribution. The stand-alone Spot term shows that rms at the bottom of the female share
distribution (the reference group) have the highest probability of exiting the market after the
reform. The exit probability increases more after the reform for the most discriminatory rms.
Importantly, the coe¢ cients on the quartile interaction terms are negative and statistically
signicant for rms in the second and third quartiles of the female share distribution, showing
that less discriminatory rms have a lower probability of exiting the market, after the policy
change, relative to more discriminatory rms. The negative relationship is also increasing in the
discrimination proxy; the coe¢ cient is larger (more negative) for rms in the third quartile than
for those in the second, showing that rms with a higher female share have a lower probability
of exiting after the reform.24 These results provide evidence that more discriminatory rms
have increased probability of exiting the market following an increase in competition, in line
with Beckers prediction that competition drives discriminatory employers out of the market.
4.3 E¤ect of the On the Spot Firm reform on growth of the female em-
ployment share
In this section, we investigate whether the rm entry reform a¤ected growth of the share of
female employment at the rm-level. That is, we assess the change in the gender workforce
composition following the policy change. Since discrimination is costly, and as shown in the
previous section, discriminatory employers reduce overall employment growth, and have higher
probability of exiting the market, it is expected that the reform, and the increased competition
it induced, increased demand for female labor. As discussed in Black and Strahan (2001),
discriminatory employers could also prefer to keep women in lower positions than implied by
their skills. The increased competition would therefore be associated with increased growth of
the female employment share, particularly in high-skill positions.
We test whether the growth rate of the females share, in total employment and in each
24The coe¢ cient on the fourth quartile interaction term is negative but statistically insignicant. Firms in the
fourth quartile have a very large female share (0.9 on average) and are in sectors where traditionally the work is
predominantly performed by females, such as textiles and apparel.
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occupation or skill category, increased following the On the Spot Firm policy change. We
estimate specications at the rm-year level, where the dependent variable is the growth rate in
the female employment share.25 The explanatory variable of interest is the On the Spot Firm
indicator, Spot. We control for industry, municipality and year xed e¤ects in our specications,
and in alternative specications for rm and year xed e¤ects, to estimate from changes within
rms. We also control for rm observable characteristics, as explained above.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 reports the results. Panel A presents results with industry, municipality and year
xed e¤ects. In column (1) we regress growth in the share of females in total employment on the
reform variable. The coe¢ cient on the On the Spot Firmvariable is positive and statistically
signicant and implies an increase in the female employment share growth of 1.4 percentage
points. The remaining columns of the table report results when the dependent variable is the
share of females in each skill or occupational category. The coe¢ cient on the reform indicator
is positive and statistically signicant for the female share growth in all skill categories, except
medium-skill. The estimated e¤ect in column (2) implies a 2.5 percentage point increase in
growth of the female share in managerial positions following the rm entry reform. The e¤ect
for high-skilled is estimated at 2.3 percentage points. In Panel B, we include rm and year xed
e¤ects, to estimate the e¤ect within rms following the reform. We continue to nd that the
reform is associated with increased growth in the female share. The e¤ect on the growth of the
female share in managerial positions remains positive but the statistical signicance is reduced.
Similar to Figure 3 above, in Figure 4 we report the estimated coe¢ cients for each lead
and lag, relative to the year of adoption of the reform in each municipality, from a specication
for growth in the female share in total employment, controlling for rm and year xed e¤ects.
We continue to nd that the e¤ect increases over time after adoption, with the duration of the
program.
[Figure 4 about here]
In sum, the results in this section suggest that the increased competition following the
reform induced rms to increase growth of the share of female employment. This is obtained
both across rms in an industry as well as within rms. The e¤ects are larger for the female
share in managerial and high-skill positions. The results are consistent with the prediction that
competition leads to increased demand for female workers. In the next section we investigate
the e¤ects of the reform on the gender pay gap.
25We use the di¤erence in the ln(female share+0.001) to account for cases where the share is zero.
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4.4 E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmreform on the gender pay gap
This section exploits the reform as a quasi-natural experiment to study how the exogenous
increase in competition a¤ects compensation, and in particular the pay di¤erential between
male and female workers. According to Beckers (1957) theory, since discrimination increases
costs, in competitive environments employers have no room to indulge their tastes for gender
discrimination. Therefore, we expect that the exogenous shock to product market competition
following the On the Spot Firmprogram will have contributed to improve female workers
relative compensation. Our identication exploits the cross-municipality-time variation in the
implementation of the program to estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap.
We start by showing in Figure 5 average log real wage for males and females in each skill
category, in each year before and after the reform was implemented in each municipality. The
solid line represents the overall mean and the dotted lines the means for male and female wages.
As shown, the pay gap between male and female workers starts to narrow, with female wages
increasing faster than male wages, since the year when the reform is implemented. That is
observed particularly for middle-managers and for high- and medium-skilled workers. The gap
between male and female wages continues to narrow in the years after adoption of the reform,
with the increase in business registration. The gure suggests that the business registration
reform has contributed to narrow the gender pay gap for those workers, in a¤ected municipalities.
But while the gure shows raw average wages over time, it does not take into account workers
and rmscharacteristics, unobserved worker heterogeneity, or general trends in wages in all
municipalities. To estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap accounting for those
factors, we turn to our regression analysis below.
[Figure 5 about here]
As a point of comparison with existing studies, we start by estimating the general gender
pay gap. We estimate a compensation regression with a female dummy included:
lnwijmt = + Femi + X
0
it + Z
0
jt + d() + ijmt (3)
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly wage of worker i (in rm j, municipality
m) in year t.26 Femi is a female dummy. We control for individual observed characteristics,
such as education, skill level, tenure and its square, occupation and type of employment contract
in matrix X 0it. Firm characteristics are included in matrix Z
0
jt: the log of size, ownership type
(domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether the rm is an exporter and a dummy
for whether the rm is multi-plant. We also control for industry (ds), municipality (dm) and
26Hourly wage is calculated as the sum of the base wage and regular contributions divided by hours of work.
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year (dt) xed e¤ects in our specications to absorb unobserved industry and municipality-
specic characteristics that may a¤ect compensation, in particular the gender pay di¤erential,
and global shocks that a¤ect all rms and workers. In alternative specications we include
rm xed e¤ects, thus estimating the gender pay gap within the same rm, controlling for all
workers and rms observable characteristics. ijmt is a random error term. A statistically
signicant coe¢ cient on the female dummy () captures the wage gap between males and
females, assuming that the worker controls included, such as education, tenure and skill level,
account for di¤erences in worker productivity.
The results from estimating equation (3) are reported in Table 8. Our data has the advant-
age, relative to most previous studies, of including information on the level of education and
the skill level of each worker. Therefore, we obtain results that control for a comprehensive set
of workerscharacteristics, accounting for di¤erences in productivity across workers. We nd
that the gender pay gap is still sizable. Our estimates in column (1) show that, controlling
for municipality, industry and year xed e¤ects, there is a 13.4% di¤erence in the level of pay
between male and female workers. This is consistent with existing studies of the gender pay
gap; for example, Blau and Kahn (2016) report estimates of around 18% for the gender pay
gap in the US. In column (2) we include rm xed e¤ects and nd that within the same rm,
the gender pay gap is estimated at 12.8%. The di¤erential in pay between male and female
workers, obtained after controlling for workers characteristics that capture among other things
di¤erences in productivity, is often interpreted as an estimate of employer discrimination - that
is, male and female workers with equal qualications and skills do not share equal pay.
[Table 8 about here]
Next, we investigate how the On the Spot Firmbusiness registration reform a¤ects em-
ployer discrimination by estimating its e¤ects on the gender pay gap. Existing evidence has
shown that the gender pay gap declined at di¤erent rates across the wage distribution; par-
ticularly, it has declined much more slowly at the top of the wage distribution than at the
bottom, and in recent years remained signicantly higher at the top (Blau and Khan, 2016).
It is therefore relevant to assess how competition a¤ects the gender pay gap for workers in
jobs that require di¤erent skill levels or in di¤erent occupations. We investigate how increased
competition following the business registration reform a¤ects the gender pay gap across the skill
distribution and across the corporate hierarchy. To that end, we estimate specications of the
form:
lnwijmkt = + 1(Femi  Sk;it  Spotmt) + 2(Femi  Sk;it) + 3(Femi  Spotmt)
+4(Sk;it  Spotmt) + 5Spotmt + 6Sk;it + X 0it + Z 0jt + d() + ijmkt (4)
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The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly wage of worker i (in rm j, muni-
cipality m, with skill level k) in year t. As above, Femi is a female dummy and Spotmt is the
reform indicator variable. Sk;it is a vector of k indicator variables for the skill category of the
worker or, in other specications, the workers occupation. As explained in Section 3, we obtain
ve skill or hierarchical categories using the classication of workers in the rmshierarchy,
presented in Table A.1. We assign workers to top-management (level 1), middle-management
(levels 2 and 3), high-skill (level 4), medium-skill (level 5) and low-skill positions (levels 6 to
8). We control for the same observed individual characteristics as above, included in X 0it, and
for rm characteristics in Z 0jt. We continue to include year (dt), industry (ds) and municipality
(dm) or rm (dj) xed e¤ects.
In addition to the other variables and controls discussed above, the linked employer-employee
data that we use allows us to also include worker or worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects in our
regressions, di and dij , respectively. Therefore, we obtain results that account for individual
heterogeneity in the structure of compensation and patterns of job mobility, and for sorting
of workers across rms.27 We cluster the standard errors by municipality, the level at which
the policy was introduced. We interact all variables with the female dummy, thus allowing
all right-hand side variables to vary by gender, including the municipality, industry and year
dummies; the latter capture for example, potential general di¤erences in wage trends between
men and women.
The coe¢ cients of interest in Equation (4) are those on the interaction terms between the
female dummy, the reform variable and the skill level of the worker, Femi  Sk;it  Spotmt. A
positive coe¢ cient is consistent with a positive di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on female pay,
relative to male pay, in a¤ected municipalities, implying a reduction in the gender pay gap.
That would be consistent with Beckers prediction that competition reduces discrimination.
The estimation results are reported in Table 9. In column (1), we present the results for the
overall gender pay gap within rms, controlling for worker and rm observable characteristics.28
As reported above, the overall gender pay gap within rms is estimated at 12.8%. In column
(2), we interact the female dummy with the skill categories, to estimate the gender pay gap
in each skill or hierarchical category. We nd that the gender pay gap is higher at the top of
a corporation, for top executives, estimated at 22.5%, followed by medium- and high-skilled
workers, with gender pay gaps of 14.5% and 13.6%, respectively. The gap in wages between
genders is lowest for unskilled workers. These results are consistent with evidence that the
gender pay gap is higher at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom.
27Match worker-rm xed e¤ects account for ex-ante sorting but not for trends; e.g., if workers whose pro-
ductivity is improving were to select into increasingly more competitive industries and rms.
28We estimate this specication without worker xed e¤ects to obtain the coe¢ cient on the female dummy,
to assess and interpret the magnitude of the e¤ects of the reform.
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[Table 9 about here]
Columns (3) and (4) report our main results, from estimating equation (4), to investigate
the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap for workers in each skill level. Each element in
1, the vector of coe¢ cients on the triple interaction terms, captures the di¤erential e¤ect of
the reform on the wage of female workers in skill category k, relative to the wage of males in
the same skill category. The interaction terms Sk;it  Spotmt capture the e¤ect of the reform
on male wages in each skill category, while the stand-alone Spotmt term captures the e¤ect for
unskilled male workers (the omitted category). The interaction Femi  Spotmt measures the
di¤erential e¤ect for females in the unskilled category.
In column (3) we control for worker xed e¤ects in addition to all other controls and xed
e¤ects discussed above. We nd that the coe¢ cients on the triple interaction terms capturing
the di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on the pay of female workers in each skill category, Femi 
Sk;it  Spotmt, are positive and statistically signicant for middle-managers and for high- and
medium-skilled workers. That is, female skilled professionals and middle-managers in a¤ected
municipalities experienced an additional increase in pay, relative to males, following the reform.
The pay of females in the high-skill and middle-managerial categories increased by an additional
1.6% and 1.5%, respectively, and of those in the medium-skill category by an extra 1%, relative
to males with the same skills.
Results remain robust in column (4), where we include worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects,
and thus identify the di¤erential impact of the reform on female pay from workers that remain
in the same rm after the policy change. This ensures that unobserved changes in composition
of employment are not driving the results. The estimated coe¢ cients imply that the gender pay
gap is reduced by 1.7 percentage points for middle-managers and high-skilled workers, and by
1 percentage point for the medium-skilled. The magnitude of these estimates is equivalent to a
reduction in the gender pay gap by 15% and 13% for middle-managers and high-skilled workers,
respectively, and by 7.6% for medium-skilled workers, relative to the overall gender pay gap for
those categories.
The interaction of the Spot variable with the female dummy is statistically insignicant
showing that the reform had no e¤ect on the gender pay gap for unskilled workers. We also nd
that the stand alone Spot term is statistically insignicant, implying that there are no statistic-
ally signicant e¤ects of the reform on unskilled workersoverall pay. However, the coe¢ cients
on the interaction Sk;it  Spotmt are positive and statistically signicant for managerial and
high-skilled workers. That is, workers in top- or middle-managerial positions and those in high-
skill jobs in a¤ected municipalities experience a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of
the rm entry reform on their wage. In particular, high-skilled workerswage is on average
1.3% higher after the reform, while the wage of top-managers and middle-managers increased
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by 3.3% and 2.2%, respectively. An explanation for the increase in the pay of workers in these
categories is that due to the entry of new rms there is increased demand for managerial and
high-skilled workers, and given inelastic supply of these professionals, their wage increases after
the reform.
The specications reported in Table 9 are equivalent to running separate regressions for male
and female workers, since all the variables are interacted with the female dummy. In Appendix
Table A.5 we present results from separate regressions for illustration. As shown in columns (1)
and (2), the overall wage of medium-skilled males was not a¤ected by the reform, but the wage
of females in the same skill category increased by 1% in treatment municipalities. For those in
high-skill jobs, while male wage increased by 1.3%, females saw their wage go up by 3% as a
result of the increased competition following the entry reform. The wage of middle-managers
increased by 2.2% for males while for females it increased by a larger 3.8%. For top-mangers,
male pay in a¤ected municipalities increased by 3.3% and femalesby 3.8%.29
An implication from Beckers model is that discriminatory employers pay women less than
equally productive men. They optimize when workersmarginal product is equal to their mar-
ginal cost (wage plus the disutility cost if the worker is a woman). The gender wage gap will thus
be larger the larger the disutility from employing women. To reconcile the di¤erential e¤ects
across the skill distribution with a theory based on preferences would require an ad-hoc assump-
tion that employerspreferences di¤er in intensity by the workersskill level. For example, that
employers hold more prejudice against women in high-skill positions or in managerial positions.
With that assumption, increased product market competition would be expected to reduce
the gender pay gap by more for workers in those skill levels or positions since the strength of
discrimination was initially higher for those workers.
Overall, the results in Table 9 imply that the entry reform is associated with a narrowing of
the gender pay gap, except for unskilled workers and for top-managers, and provide empirical
support for the prediction that increased product market competition reduces discrimination,
reected in lower female wages. Our ndings thus provide quasi-natural experimental evidence
for the dynamic implication from Beckers (1957) theory: discrimination is hard to sustain in a
competitive environment and increased competition contributes to reduce discrimination.
In the baseline model specications reported in Table 9 we identify the average treatment
e¤ect of the On the Spot Firmprogram over all the years since its introduction. We will now
focus on an event study, in which we estimate treatment e¤ects at each year, thus assessing
whether the e¤ects vary with the duration of the program and the increase in registration. This
also conrms whether the e¤ects are not statistically signicant prior to introduction of the
29These overall e¤ects are the same as those obtained in Table 9 by summing the coe¢ cients on the terms
Femi  Sk;it  Spotmt and Sk;it  Spotmt. In Table 9 we can determine directly whether the di¤erence between
the e¤ects for male and for female workers is statistically signicant, which is the case for all except top-managers.
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reform, important for our identication strategy. To that end, we estimate specications of the
form:
lnwijmkt = +
X
l
1l(Femi  Sk;it  Spotml) + 2(Femi  Sk;it) +X
l
3l(Femi  Spotml) +
X
l
4l(Sk;it  Spotml) +X
l
5lSpotml + 6Sk;it + X
0
it + Z
0
jt + d(:) + ijmkt (5)
Here, we include interaction terms for each pre-treatment year and for each treatment year.
Spotml is a set of dummy variables for each lag and lead, l, relative to the year of implementation
of the reform in municipality m. In this specication, each coe¢ cient, on the lags and leads,
is estimated relative to the period prior to t-4, and to non-adopters. Figure 6 presents the
estimated coe¢ cients of interest, on the Fem  Sk  Spot interaction terms, which capture
the di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on female pay, as well as the 95% condence interval (CI).
The dots on the solid line are the estimated coe¢ cients and the two dashed lines are the 95%
condence bands of the estimates. We report the coe¢ cients and CI for each skill category, as
discussed above.
[Figure 6 about here]
As shown in Figure 6, the coe¢ cients for each year prior to the On the Spot Firmpro-
gram are small, often negative and, importantly, statistically insignicant. This supports our
identication, and conrms that there is no evidence of anticipatory e¤ects. After the reform is
implemented, we obtain positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients, particularly for middle-
managers and for high- and medium-skilled workers, but not for top-managers, consistent with
the results from Table 9. Interestingly, we also nd that the e¤ects increase over time with the
increase in business registration.
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of increased competition resultant from the business registra-
tion reform on the gender pay gap for managerial and non-managerial workers. We estimate a
specication similar to equation (4), with the same controls and xed e¤ects, but instead of the
triple interaction terms with the ve skill categories, we include an interaction with a dummy
variable for whether the worker is in a managerial position. Workers in managerial positions
are those in levels 1 (Top executives) and 2 (Intermediary executives) in the classication
described in Table A.1. Table 10 reports the results. In column (1) we estimate the average
gender pay gap for all workers and in column (2) we interact the female dummy with the mana-
gerial indicator to estimate the di¤erential gender pay gap for managerial workers. Consistent
with previous estimates, the gender pay gap is wider for managers than for non-managers, by
5.8 percentage points.
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[Table 10 about here]
In column (3) we estimate the e¤ect of the On the Spot Firm program on the gender
pay gap for managerial and non-managerial workers. We include worker xed e¤ects as well
as all other controls and xed e¤ects, as in Table 9. We nd that the triple interaction cap-
turing the di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on female managerspay is positive and statistically
signicant, implying a reduction in the managerial gender pay gap. Column (4) reports results
with rm-worker match xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the di¤erential e¤ect of the policy on
female managerspay remains positive, statistically signicant and of similar magnitude. The
magnitude of the estimates implies that while male managerspay increased overall by 3% fol-
lowing the reform, female managerspay increased by 3.5% and the di¤erence is statistically
signicant (see also Table A.5). These results show that the reform contributed to narrow the
pay gap between male and female managerial workers. Higher demand for managers following
the increased rm entry with an inelastic supply of managers is a potential explanation for the
increase in overall managerial wage.
In Table 11, we estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay di¤erential across the
corporate hierarchy, using occupations to look at a ner classication of managerial positions.
We obtain estimates for the impact on Directors and Chief Executives(ISCO88 category 121;
CEOs for short), Department Managers(ISCO88 categories 122 and 123; DM for short) and
other workers in the corporation. We estimate equation (4) but where Sk;it is now a vector of
indicator variables for whether the worker is a CEO, a DM or other (the omitted category).
The results in columns (1) and (2), for the gender pay gap, remain similar to previous tables.
In column (3), the estimates of the triple interactions of main interest show that while the
reform reduced the gender pay gap for department managers, the di¤erential e¤ect on female
CEOspay, relative to males, is not statistically signicant. This is consistent with the results
from Table 9, showing that the reform had no statistically signicant e¤ect on the gender pay
gap for top-managers. Results with match xed e¤ects, presented in column (4), remain robust.
Existing evidence documents the relative absence of females from the top executive job. Our
results show that females that break the glass ceilingand reach the top of a corporation still
have lower pay than their male counterparts, and increased product market competition does
not improve their relative pay. This suggests that the labor market for Chief Executives still
especially favors men. We also nd that the reform has a positive and statistically signicant
e¤ect on CEOsand department managerspay in treated municipalities. The Fem  CEO
term is negative and statistically signicant, showing that females that are promoted to the
CEO position have a lower pay increase than their male counterparts.
[Table 11 about here]
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Overall, our results in this section provide empirical support for the prediction that increased
competition reduces the gender pay gap; but the reduction in the gender pay gap is observed
for those in high- and medium-skill occupations and in middle-managerial positions and is not
observed for top-executives or for unskilled workers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate empirically the dynamic implication from Beckers (1957) theory
that increased product market competition reduces gender discrimination. Discriminatory em-
ployers hire fewer women and more men than prot maximization would imply. Males are paid
more than females with the same skills and productivity, and thus employers give up prots to
indulge their discriminatory tastes. Since discrimination increases costs, it becomes hard to sus-
tain in a competitive market. Increased competition forces discriminatory employers to change
their behavior, reducing the wage di¤erential between male and female workers. Increased
product market competition therefore reduces gender discrimination.
We exploit the On the Spot Firm, a comprehensive business registration reform introduced
in Portugal from 2005, as a quasi-natural experiment, which exogenously increased product
market competition. Prior to 2005, to register a new business entrepreneurs would need to full
11 procedures in a process that took on average 78 days and cost 13.5% of GDP per capita. The
On the Spot Firmreform was introduced with the objective of cutting red tape, reducing the
time, cost and complexity of registering a new rm. The program established one-stop shops
where entrepreneurs can register a company in a single o¢ ce desk in less than a hour at a cost
of around 3% of GDP per capita. The program was initially introduced in a few municipalities
and was progressively rolled-out randomly across municipalities over time. The program was
very successful, and as a result Portugal rose from 113th to 26th in the World Bank Ease of
Doing Businessranking of countries.
We use matched employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and work-
ers in Portugal to investigate the e¤ect of the increased competition following the reform on
the relationship between discrimination and rm survival and growth, growth of the female
employment share and on the pay di¤erential between men and women. We exploit the cross-
municipality-year variation in the implementation of the program for identication. In addition
to unusually detailed observable worker and rm characteristics, such as education, skill level,
occupation, we control for worker or worker-rm xed e¤ects and thus identify the impact of
the reform accounting for unobserved worker characteristics or from individuals who stay in the
same rm after the reform.
We show that the business registration reform increased rm entry signicantly within in-
dustries and municipalities, thus contributing to increase competition. We then investigate the
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e¤ects of the reform on gender discrimination. We nd that non-discriminatory employers, prox-
ied by a larger female employment share, increase overall employment growth after the reform,
while discriminatory employers grow less over time and are more likely to exit the market. We
also nd that the reform is associated with increased growth in the female employment share,
particularly in managerial and high-skill occupations. This suggests that increased competition
following the reform induced rms to increase demand for female labor.
We estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the gender pay gap, for workers in di¤erent skill
categories and across the corporate hierarchy. We nd that the entry reform reduced the gender
pay gap for middle-managers, high-skilled and medium-skilled workers in a¤ected municipalities.
The di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on female workerspay in treatment municipalities is positive
and statistically signicant. Our estimates imply that the gender pay gap is reduced by 1.7
percentage points for middle-managers and high-skilled workers and by 1 percentage point for
medium-skilled workers. The magnitude of these estimates is equivalent to a reduction in the
gender pay gap by 15% and 13% for middle-managers and high-skilled workers, respectively, and
by 7.6% for medium-skilled workers, relative to the overall gender pay gap for those categories.
The e¤ects on the gender pay gap are not found for unskilled workers or for CEOs. The labor
market for the top executive still especially favors men and increased competition does not
improve femalesrelative pay.
Our ndings are consistent with the prediction from Becker (1957) that product market
competition reduces employer discrimination. Increased competition leads to a higher e¢ ciency
loss from discriminating against women, inducing surviving discriminatory rms to change their
behavior. Our results have important policy implications. Discrimination has been shown to
create ine¢ ciencies that contribute to signicantly reduce output across countries (e.g. Caval-
canti and Tavares, 2016). Our ndings that reducing entry barriers in Portugal contributes to
reduce gender discrimination, particularly the gender pay gap among skilled and managerial
workers, suggest that deregulation contributes to reduce ine¢ ciencies arising from gender dis-
crimination.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Sample size
Year All rms Entrants % Entrants Workers
"On the Spot"
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002 211,113 13,389 1,796,261
2003 215,354 15,603 1,756,603
2004 218,817 14,593 1,790,370
2005 233,514 16,509 20.01 1,925,115
2006 235,094 17,147 42.32 1,933,797
2007 255,757 20,182 51.24 2,050,843
2008 258,943 20,413 66.42 2,085,363
2009 253,148 17,382 76.26 2,002,222
Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Table 2: Detailed summary statistics of logged hourly real wage, by group of workers and gender
ln(hourly real pay) Mean Median Std. Dev. P10 P90 Nb. Obs.
Skill levels
Top management 2.351 2.351 0.728 1.368 3.286 552,936
Males 2.435 2.473 0.754 1.388 3.382 360,812
Females 2.193 2.174 0.647 1.337 3.035 192,124
Middle management 1.955 1.918 0.544 1.288 2.684 972,327
Males 1.979 1.936 0.548 1.312 2.716 670,380
Females 1.901 1.876 0.532 1.238 2.599 301,947
High skill 1.866 1.850 0.513 1.204 2.531 740,749
Males 1.912 1.900 0.528 1.230 2.597 415,688
Females 1.807 1.789 0.487 1.172 2.433 325,061
Medium skill 1.383 1.318 0.371 0.975 1.872 5,277,133
Males 1.445 1.377 0.374 1.033 1.939 3,242,480
Females 1.285 1.214 0.344 0.930 1.737 2,034,653
Low skill 1.198 1.138 0.293 0.886 1.572 4,341,500
Males 1.272 1.213 0.324 0.904 1.701 1,856,241
Females 1.143 1.095 0.253 0.881 1.456 2,485,259
Executives
CEOs 3.020 3.064 0.783 1.956 4.007 21,422
Males 3.112 3.177 0.764 2.073 4.052 17,265
Females 2.638 2.585 0.741 1.712 3.604 4,157
Department managers 2.539 2.563 0.725 1.549 3.453 189,944
Males 2.602 2.642 0.732 1.583 3.514 137,652
Females 2.373 2.373 0.679 1.473 3.245 52,292
Other workers 1.417 1.299 0.471 0.947 2.074 11,673,279
Males 1.508 1.394 0.488 1.003 2.184 6,390,684
Females 1.307 1.185 0.425 0.908 1.890 5,282,595
Managerial
Managerial 2.236 2.215 0.679 1.346 3.122 992,382
Males 2.295 2.289 0.711 1.347 3.217 638,589
Females 2.129 2.112 0.601 1.342 2.915 353,793
Non-managerial 1.365 1.273 0.412 0.941 1.930 10,892,263
Males 1.453 1.364 0.427 0.993 2.041 5,907,012
Females 1.261 1.164 0.367 0.905 1.739 4,985,251
All workers 1.437 1.307 0.502 0.949 2.129 11,884,645
Males 1.535 1.406 0.526 1.006 2.254 6,545,601
Females 1.318 1.189 0.443 0.909 1.925 5,339,044
Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009). These statistics are computed using the
estimation sample.
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Table 3: Pre-reform average growth rates of outcome variables
Late adopters Early adopters Di¤erence P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Compensation
Skill levels
Top management 0.037 0.042 -0.004 0.723
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
Middle management 0.026 0.034 -0.008 0.308
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
High-skill 0.022 0.033 -0.010 0.230
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Medium-skill 0.015 0.019 -0.004 0.431
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Low-skill 0.014 0.016 -0.002 0.704
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Executives
CEOs 0.050 0.038 0.012 0.694
(0.020) (0.017) (0.030)
Department managers 0.031 0.057 -0.026 0.114
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
Other workers 0.018 0.022 -0.004 0.292
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Managerial work
Managerial 0.032 0.046 -0.014 0.223
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Non-managerial 0.017 0.021 -0.004 0.352
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Gender pay gap -0.143 -0.136 -0.007 0.257
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm entry 0.155 0.114 0.040 0.615
(0.046) (0.030) (0.080)
Employment growth 0.031 0.031 -0.000 0.970
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Female employment share growth
Managerial 0.119 0.041 0.078 0.230
(0.037) (0.026) (0.064)
High-skill 0.130 0.094 0.036 0.484
(0.030) (0.017) (0.051)
Medium-skill -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.952
(0.013) (0.011) (0.024)
Low-skill -0.007 -0.011 0.004 0.869
(0.012) (0.010) (0.022)
The table reports initial growth trends (between 2002 and 2004) of average wages, rm entry, employ-
ment growth and female employment share growth. For the gender pay gap, we report the coe¢ cient
of a female dummy from compensation regressions, for early and for late adopters, over the pre-reform
period; we include the same controls as in column (1) of Table 8. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis of equality between the means (propor-
tions).
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Table 4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry
Dependent variable: New rms New rms/incumbents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stop 0.474*** 0.430*** 0.007** 0.009***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 1.558*** 2.122*** 0.069*** 0.061***
(0.108) (0.113) (0.002) (0.004)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.343 0.014 0.068
No. Obs. 56,782 56,782 55,784 55,784
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the number of new rms and
in columns (3) and (4) the ratio of new rms to incumbents. Observations are
by municipality-industry-year. We report results from OLS estimation. Robust
standard errors, clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program and female share on rm growth
Panel A
Dependent variable: Employment growth
Female share: Femsharet-1 Femsharepre-spot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FemshareStop 0.004* 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Stop 0.001 -0.005** -0.008*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Femshare -0.009*** -0.011** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Constant -0.011*** 0.002 0.005* -0.005***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.010
No. Obs 1,081,868 1,081,868 647,249 647,249
Panel B
Dependent variable: Employment growth
Female share Femsharet-1 Femsharepre-spot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FemshareStop 0.008 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Stop 0.000 -0.010** -0.013*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Femshare -0.008** 0.054*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004)
Constant -0.003 -0.021*** 0.018*** -0.000
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.018
No. Obs. 306,506 306,506 205,743 205,743
The dependent variable is the growth rate (ln di¤erence) in rm employment. Fem-
share is the discrimination proxy: the share of females in the rms workforce. Ob-
servations are by rm-year. Panel A reports results for the full sample of rms,
while Panel B reports results for the sample that excludes very small rms, with
less than 10 workers throughout. Additional controls include whether the rm is an
exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and ownership type. Robust standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program and female share on rm survival
Dependent Variable: Pr(Firm exit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stop 0.004 0.024*** 0.011** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
StopFemshare -0.004 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008)
StopFemsh-quartile 2 -0.012*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.005)
StopFemsh-quartile 3 -0.016*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.005)
StopFemsh-quartile 4 -0.005 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007)
Femshare 0.013***
(0.003)
Femsh-quartile 2 0.003**
(0.001)
Femsh-quartile 3 0.007***
(0.002)
Femsh-quartile 4 0.011***
(0.002)
Constant 0.026*** 0.303*** 0.027*** 0.303***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.043 0.094 0.043 0.094
No. Obs. 153,374 153,374 153,374 153,374
The dependent variable is the probability of rm exit; it takes the value 1 if the rm
exits the market in year t and zero if it survives. Femshare is the discrimination proxy:
the share of females in the rms workforce in the year prior to the introduction of
the reform. Femsh-quartile q are quartile dummies of the female share, taking the
value 1 if a rm is in quartile q of the female share distribution and zero otherwise.
Observations are by rm-year. The sample excludes very small rms, with less than
10 workers throughout. Additional controls include rm size, whether the rm is an
exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and ownership type. Robust standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 7: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the female employment share growth
Panel A
Dependent variable: Female share growth
All Managerial High-skill Medium-skill Low-skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stop 0.014*** 0.025** 0.023*** -0.003 0.016**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -0.083*** 0.043* 0.050*** -0.132*** -0.024**
(0.006) (0.024) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
No. Obs. 1,081,868 187,699 326,843 726,505 574,422
Panel B
Dependent variable: Female share growth
All Managerial High-skill Medium-skill Low-skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stop 0.015*** 0.022 0.022** -0.006 0.017**
(0.005) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant -0.690*** -0.542*** -0.592*** -0.521*** -0.554***
(0.014) (0.050) (0.037) (0.021) (0.023)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003
No. Obs. 1,081,868 187,699 326,843 726,505 574,422
The dependent variable is the growth rate (ln di¤erence) in the female employment share in each skill
category. We use the natural log of the shares plus 0.001 to account for cases in which the share is zero.
Observations are by rm-year. Additional controls include the ln of size, whether the rm is an exporter,
whether it is multiestablishment and ownership type. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality,
are reported in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Overall gender pay gap
Dependent variable: ln Compensation
(1) (2)
Female -0.134*** -0.128***
(0.002) (0.002)
Med-skill 0.130*** 0.144***
(0.003) (0.002)
High-skill 0.365*** 0.332***
(0.011) (0.010)
Mid-manag 0.476*** 0.484***
(0.006) (0.006)
Top-manag 0.710*** 0.739***
(0.007) (0.006)
Isced2 0.069*** 0.049***
(0.002) (0.001)
Isced3 0.148*** 0.103***
(0.004) (0.003)
Isced56 0.433*** 0.339***
(0.005) (0.004)
ln(rm size) 0.025*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Firm FE Yes
R2 0.610 0.451
No. Obs. 11,884,645 11,884,645
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly
wage. ISCED are the educational categories, dened in
Section 4.1. Skill categories are also dened in Section
4.1. Other covariates include the workers tenure and its
square, the type of employment contract (whether open-
ended or xed-term), the instrument of collective regula-
tion, the number of times a worker is promoted, the share
of females in the workforce, the share of low-skilled workers
in total rm employment, whether the rm is an exporter,
whether it is multi-establishment, and ownership. Robust
standard errors, clustered by rm, are reported in paren-
theses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the gender pay gap, by skill levels
Dependent variable: ln Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.128*** -0.096***
(0.003) (0.004)
Med-skillFemaleStop 0.010** 0.011*
(0.005) (0.006)
High-skillFemaleStop 0.016*** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.007)
Mid-managFemaleStop 0.015** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.007)
Top-managFemaleStop 0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.006)
FemaleStop -0.004 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Med-skillStop 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
High-skillStop 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
Mid-managStop 0.026*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.004)
Top-managStop 0.039*** 0.033***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stop -0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Med-skill 0.144*** 0.167*** 0.048*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
High-skill 0.332*** 0.352*** 0.079*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Mid-manag 0.484*** 0.497*** 0.114*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Top-manag 0.739*** 0.788*** 0.127*** 0.064***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003)
Med-skillFemale -0.049*** -0.024*** -0.011***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
High-skillFemale -0.040*** -0.019*** -0.009**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Mid-managFemale -0.018** -0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Top-managFemale -0.129*** -0.013*** 0.001
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Promotions -0.033*** -0.033*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PromotionsFemale -0.008*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes
R2 0.451 0.452 0.111 0.089
No. Obs. 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly pay. Skill categories are dened in Section 4.1. Other covariates include
the workers tenure and its square, the level of education, the type of employment contract (whether open-ended or xed-term),
the instrument of collective regulation, the natural log of rm size (number of employees), the share of females in the workforce,
the share of low skilled workers in total rm employment, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and
ownership type. In columns (3) and (4) all righ-hand side variables are interacted with the female dummy, including the xed
e¤ects. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the gender pay gap, managerial
Dependent variable: ln Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.128*** -0.122***
(0.003) (0.003)
ManagerFemaleStop 0.006* 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003)
FemaleStop 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
ManagerStop 0.034*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.004)
Stop -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Manager 0.123*** 0.142*** -0.004 -0.007**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
ManagerFemale -0.058*** -0.007 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Med-skill 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.049*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill 0.339*** 0.340*** 0.085*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Mid-manag 0.437*** 0.439*** 0.121*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Top-manag 0.631*** 0.632*** 0.136*** 0.072***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003)
Med-skillFemale -0.020*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.002)
High-skillFemale -0.012*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Mid-managFemale 0.005 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Top-managFemale -0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Promotions -0.034*** -0.034*** 0.036*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PromotionsFemale -0.007*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes
Match FE Yes
R2 0.453 0.453 0.110 0.089
No. Obs 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly pay. Workers in managerial positions are those in levels 1 ("Top
management") or 2 ("Middle management") in the classication described in Table A.1. Other covariates include the workers
tenure and its square, the level of education, the type of employment contract (whether open-ended or xed-term), the
instrument of collective regulation, the natural log of rm size (number of employees), the share of females in the workforce, the
share of low skilled workers in total rm employment, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and
ownership type. In columns (3) and (4) all righ-hand side variables are interacted with the female dummy, including the xed
e¤ects. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 11: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the gender pay gap, by occupation
Dependent variable: ln Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.124*** -0.122***
(0.003) (0.003)
Dept-ManagFemaleStop 0.018*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
CEOFemaleStop -0.003 0.005
(0.011) (0.012)
FemaleStop 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Dept-ManagStop 0.033*** 0.037***
(0.006) (0.005)
CEOStop 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stop 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Dept-Manag 0.379*** 0.406*** 0.074*** 0.043***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
CEO 0.695*** 0.743*** 0.121*** 0.069***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007)
Dept-ManagFemale -0.100*** -0.020*** -0.010**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
CEOFemale -0.247*** -0.045*** -0.024**
(0.018) (0.011) (0.011)
Med-skill 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.049*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.084*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Mid-manag 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.121*** 0.067***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
Top-manag 0.605*** 0.606*** 0.127*** 0.066***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
Med-skillFemale -0.020*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002)
High-skillFemale -0.011*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Mid-managFemale 0.004 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005)
Top-managFemale -0.004 0.008**
(0.004) (0.003)
Promotions -0.031*** -0.031*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PromotionsFemale -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003)
Municipality FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes
Match FE Yes
R2 0.469 0.470 0.111 0.089
No. Obs. 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645 11,884,645
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly pay. CEOs are workers whose 3-digit ISCO88 occupation is 121,
Department mangers are those in the 3-digit occupations 122 or 123. Other covariates include the workers tenure and its square,
the level of education, the type of employment contract (whether open-ended or xed-term), the instrument of collective
regulation, the natural log of rm size (number of employees), the share of female workers in total rm employment, the share of
low skilled workers in total rm employment, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and ownership.
In columns (3) and (4) all righ-hand side variables are interacted with the female dummy, including the xed e¤ects. Robust
standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Introduction of the "On the Spot Firm" program by year and municipality
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Figure 2: Average number of entrants over time, relative to the year of adoption of the "On the
Spot Firm" program
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Figure 3: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry over time
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Figure 4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on female employment share growth over
time
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Figure 5: Average wages over time, relative to the year of adoption of the "On the Spot Firm"
program
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Figure 6: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the gender pay gap over time
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Classication of workers according to the skill requirement of the tasks
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top man-
agement)
Denition of the rm general
policy or consulting on the or-
ganization of the rm; stra-
tegic planning; creation or ad-
aptation of technical, scientic
and administrative methods or
processes
Knowledge of management
and coordination of rms
fundamental activities; know-
ledge of management and
coordination of the funda-
mental activities in the eld
to which the individual is
assigned and that requires the
study and research of high
responsibility and technical
level problems
2. Intermediary executives
(middle management)
Organization and adaptation
of the guidelines established
by the superiors and directly
linked with the executive work
Technical and professional
qualications directed to
executive, research, and
management work
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as direc-
ted by the superiors, but re-
quiring the knowledge of ac-
tion processes
Complete professional qualic-
ation with a specialization
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high tech-
nical value and dened in gen-
eral terms by the superiors
Complete professional quali-
cation with a specialization
adding to theoretical and ap-
plied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks,
usually not repetitive, and
dened by the superiors
Complete professional qualic-
ation implying theoretical and
applied knowledge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well dened tasks, mainly
manual or mechanical (no in-
tellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualication in a
limited eld or practical and
elementary professional know-
ledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally de-
termined
Practical knowledge and easily
acquired in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, train-
ees
Apprenticeship
Hierarchical levels dened according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira, 2003).
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Table A.3: Summary statistics of rm- and municipality-level variables
Mean Std.dev. No. Obs.
Firm Size (all rms) 10.677 72.930 1,428,151
Share of females in workforce (all rms) 0.461 0.417 1,428,151
Share of low skilled workers (all rms) 0.349 0.380 1,428,151
Firm Size (incumbents) 9.691 75.330 1,746,522
Firm Size (new entrant rms) 4.002 15.974 135,218
Femsharet 1 (all rms) 0.456 0.412 1,081,868
Femsharepre spot (all rms) 0.467 0.402 647,249
Femsharet 1 (excluding small rms) 0.394 0.336 306,506
Femsharepre spot (excluding small rms) 0.406 0.331 205,743
Female share growth
All workers 0.013 1.393 1,081,868
Managerial 0.034 1.679 187,699
High-skilled 0.048 1.673 326,843
Medium-skilled 0.007 1.518 726,505
Low-skilled -0.002 1.422 574,422
Number of new entrant rms (municipality-industry) 2.406 8.272 56,782
New rms/incumbents (municipality-industry) 0.073 0.177 55,784
Characteristics of new rms in treatment municipalities
Size 3.917 15.747 47,716
ln(real sales) 10.338 1.210 8,425
Survival rate after 2 years 0.779
Characteristics of new rms in non-treatment municipalities
Size 4.048 16.096 87,502
ln(real sales) 10.411 1.191 15,733
Survival rate after 2 years 0.751
Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009). Statistics computed using the estimation samples.
Survival rates were estimated for rms created in or after 2005. We allowed for a one-year window of observation to
identify rm closures. We have tested whether the observed di¤erences in the survivor functions for municipalities
with and without one-stop shops are statistically signicant and rejected the null hypothesis of no subgroup
di¤erences in survivor functions.
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Table A.4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry, negative binomial estimates
Dependent variable: New rms
(2) (3)
Stop 0.075*** 0.079***
(0.019) (0.020)
ME 0.182*** 0.196***
(0.046) (0.050)
Constant 0.590*** 0.287***
(0.017) (0.047)
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.061 0.291
No. Obs. 56,782 56,782
The dependent variable is the number of new
rms. Observations are by municipality-industry-year.
These results come from negative binomial estimation.
ME stands for marginal e¤ects. Robust standard er-
rors, clustered by municipality are reported in paren-
theses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.5: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on the gender pay gap, by gender
Dependent variable: ln Compensation
Skill levels Managerial Occupation
Male Female Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Med-skillStop -0.001 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
High-skillStop 0.013*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.006)
Mid-managStop 0.022*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.004)
Top-managStop 0.033*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.003)
ManagerStop 0.030*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.003)
Dept-ManagStop 0.037*** 0.048***
(0.005) (0.006)
CEOStop 0.038*** 0.043***
(0.005) (0.010)
Stop -0.002 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Med-skill 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
High-skill 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mid-manag 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.078***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006)
Top-manag 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.066*** 0.074***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Manager -0.007** -0.013
(0.003) (0.009)
Dept-Manag 0.043*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.006)
CEO 0.069*** 0.045***
(0.007) (0.012)
Promotions 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.086 0.093 0.086 0.092 0.086 0.092
No. Obs. 6,545,601 5,339,044 6,545,601 5,339,044 6,545,601 5,339,044
The dependent variable is the natural log of real hourly pay. Skill categories are dened in Section 3.1. Other
covariates include the workerstenure and its square, the level of education, the type of employment contract (whether
open-ended or xed-term), the instrument of collective regulation, the natural log of rm size (number of employees),
the share of females in the workforce, the share of low skilled workers in total rm employment, whether the rm is an
exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, and ownership type. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality,
are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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